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and 3 would that this been consi	ld fit into the activity was idered a part	orsed the project a considered ways in the agreed activity considered separate of the agreed activities asked whether	which recommends problem. ble and as far as ivity problem.	ations B-1, 2, replied s known had not	25 X 1
furtheranc There bein	e of the reco	r offices Lablesout	ed considered ac	ction and	
4. I	recommendation in answer to a it was expla	ne within CIA was n a query as to what ained that within this effort, point	e, the problem of ext discussed. is now being don	f how to imple-	

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agencies must begin to insist upon source identification, a practice now followed in OSO, OPC and OO.

- 6. The technique of handling suspect reports was discussed at length.
- 7. A proposal was made that the analytical desks forward suspicious material from all sources to OSO, where the desks may be in a position to coordinate and recommend. Upon agreement, procedure was discussed at length and it was determined that the method of detection beyond this initial step should be incorporated in an OSO plan to be submitted at the later conference. Such plan would include encouragement of inter-office conferences at the working level by activities of common subjects, area, or concern.
- 8. The ability to undertake this project was discussed and it was agreed that OSO should be the CIA control.
- 9. The "burn" procedures were discussed. It was pointed out that this OSO procedure is now in effect, indicating, however, its limitations unless other Agencies contribute fully to the material to be used in "burn" reports. The "burn" procedures as explained were agreed to as a CIA procedure.
- 10. Pointed out was the necessity for verbatim rather than highly "edited" reports in that items deleted might, in many cases, be the items which would show a similarity or fabrication of the reports. It was considered desirable that, especially in the scientific and technical fields, original raw reports be submitted to Washington by all field stations.
- 11. The procedures planned for OSO in implementing the over-all working of the interior techniques, in which the area desks would probably be the first ones to detect fabrication, were then outlined.
- 13. In answer to a query as to recommendations contained in B-3, as to the advisability of establishing an Inter-Agency Committee of the IAC, it was the concensus of opinion that it is inadvisable at this time to recommend the establishment of any type of inter-agency committee until the techniques have been proved by experience within CIA.

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In summary, the conference resolved that:

- A. Pursuit of this subject is not only desirable but necessary;
- B. All offices of CIA would cooperate;
- C. OSO would draw up plans for the implementation of procedures within CIA to establish the means of detection of suspect material and necessary source control;
- D. The "burn" process meets with approval;
- E. No inter-agency committee be considered until the procedures have been worked out within CIA;

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